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Abstract—Sixth generation systems are expected to face new
security challenges, while opening up new frontiers towards
context awareness in the wireless edge. The workhorse behind
this projected technological leap will be a whole new set of
sensing capabilities predicted for 6G devices, in addition to the
ability to achieve high precision localization. The combination
of these enhanced traits can give rise to a new breed of context-
aware security protocols, following the quality of security (QoSec)
paradigm. In this framework, physical layer security solutions
emerge as competitive candidates for low complexity, low-delay
and low-footprint, adaptive, flexible and context aware security
schemes, leveraging the physical layer of the communications in
genuinely cross-layer protocols, for the first time.
I. INTRODUCTION
While contemporary security literature predominantly fo-
cuses on the 5G core network, the enhancement of the security
of the sixth generation (6G) wireless access becomes of critical
importance. Notably, some of the recent, increasingly sophisti-
cated attacks on the wireless edge, e.g., jamming or false base
stations, can be implemented with a price tag as low as 1k$
using low-cost software defined radios, while in addition, we
experience an expansion of the attack surface with artificial
intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) tools. In parallel,
proposals for the flexible allocation of the infrastructure re-
sources under the umbrella of network slicing, brought about
the need for multi-domain orchestration, typically implemented
using ML. As we move gradually away from the standard
client-server networking paradigm and enter a new era of
truly end-to-end (E2E) quality of service (QoS), service level
agreements (SLAs) in the near future will be expected to
include guarantees about the quality of security (QoSec) as
well. Defining the right ingredients of QoSec, including how
to identify the security level required and propose adaptive,
dynamic and risk aware security solutions, is currently being
investigated.
Meanwhile, the evolution towards 6G systems is expected
to introduce new means to harvest and interpret the “con-
text” of the communication; related aspects encompass high-
precision localization – projected to reach centimetre level –
sensing from multiple sources that will allow obtaining an
understanding of the type of nodes, in addition to the time
of communication and the age of information, the type of data
exchanged, etc. Incorporating context awareness in QoSec is
projected to allow handling more efficiently aspects related to
identifying the risk or threat level and the required security
level. In this framework, incorporating security solutions from
the palette of physical layer security (PLS) can be particularly
attractive due to their low computational complexity (relevant
implementations are based on standard encoders) and their
inherent ability to adapt to the transmission medium properties;
these properties make PLS particularly attractive for massive
machine type communications (mMTC) and ultra-low latency
use cases.
In the rest of this article, we will begin in Section II with a
review of open security issues in 5G and research challenges
ahead of 6G and move on to presenting a roadmap of ideas
to address these challenges by leveraging context awareness
and incorporating PLS schemes in future security protocols in
Section III. To illustrate some of the proposed ideas we outline
viable solutions to address specific security vulnerabilities in
5G and 6G, along with a discussion of possible further direc-
tions. Conclusions and the authors’ aspiration are presented in
Section IV.
II. OPEN 5G SECURITY ISSUES AND SECURITY
RESEARCH CHALLENGES AHEAD OF 6G
Despite the strengthening of 5G security protocols with
respect to previous generations, there are still open issues
that have not yet been fully addressed, e.g., attacks under
the generic umbrella of “false base stations”. In parallel, in
the path towards the 6G evolution, new security challenges
arise as a result of drastic changes in key operation param-
eters, indicatively, i) the E2E latency tolerance; ii) the sheer
scale of networks in mMTC use cases and very large scale
Internet of things (IoT); iii) the long lifespan of deployed IoT
devices (notably sensors) that will need to be secured; iv) the
wide palette of underlying RF technologies involved; v) the
accelerated steps taken towards bringing quantum computers
to life, to name but a few. In the following, we provide
a short review of open security issues in 5G and of some
of the security challenges in the evolution towards 6G. This
discussion provides the motivation for our proposal of context-























which will also be able to leverage the physical layer to provide
flexible and adaptive security guarantees.
A. False Base Station Attacks
The expression “false base stations” (FBS) describes wire-
less devices that impersonate genuine base stations. They are
considered a significant threat to mobile network operation,
and, thus, means to detect them are important. The 3GPP 5G
Security Specification (TS 33.501) has currently no normative
text on this. The topic is currently further studied by the
SA3 working group, documented in TR 33.809 [1]. There
can be various types of FBSs, and different attacks carried
out by them. Prevalent between them is the FBS acting as
an IMSI catcher in 3G / 4G, which is no longer possible
in 5G, as the IMSI is encrypted. Another type of FBS is a
“man-in-the-middle FBS” (MitM-FBS), as mentioned in TR
33.809. Other types of attacks are to be considered very
seriously, such as MitM-FBS acting as a very stealthy and
targeted jammer. A major vulnerability highlighted by FBSs
is that the phases of entry into the network, which precede
the enactment of the 5G security protocols, are particularly
critical for many of the attacks described in TR 33.809. For
example, attacks consisting in replaying modified versions of
the broadcast channels can have disastrous consequences on
all the terminals of a cell, hindering their connection to the
network or forcing them to operate in a degraded mode. As
a result, it is necessary to propose methods that allow the
user equipment (UE) to determine whether a base station is
legitimate, prior to executing certain procedures based on
unauthenticated messages, even though the specifications do
not require such a mechanism at present.
B. Security Challenges in Ultra Reliable and Low Latency
Communications (URLLC)
Critical ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC)
are typically used for industrial IoT and other applications
requiring low latency and very high reliability. To achieve
high reliability, a possible avenue is by increasing diversity,
e.g., multiple parallel transmissions can be exploited. However,
this consequently increases the “attack surface”, while it might
also impose more stringent constraints in terms of the speed
of integrity checks (message authentication). As an example,
in order to authenticate a given message a certain number
(usually at least 128) of extra bits are needed and as a
result, the overhead in short packet communication can be
substantial. Furthermore, particular use cases (e.g., vehicle-to-
everything, V2X) require both extremely low latency and high-
speed device authentication and re-authentication for initial
access, as well as very fast handover procedures. This could
be problematic not only because of the involved computa-
tions but also because of the transmission overhead and its
induced latency increase. Overly aggressive latency targets
could entail a new security architecture altogether. In a nut-
shell, while state-of-the-art proposals for fast authentication
using implicit certificates or certificateless solutions can speed
up authentication, many open challenges for sub-millisecond
delay constrained URLLC systems remain, with respect not
only to authentication, but as well for protecting the integrity
and the confidentiality of both the control and data planes, as
documented in [2].
C. Jamming Attacks in mMIMO — RF Resilience
Although multiple input multiple output (MIMO) systems,
including massive MIMO (mMIMO), make eavesdropping
more difficult thanks to energy focusing, they nevertheless
also introduce vulnerability points. Indeed, beamforming in
mMIMO systems relies on accurate channel estimation. Pilots
are transmitted in order to obtain the channel state information
(CSI), which in turns allows precoding. If the CSI is not
correctly estimated (e.g., because of interference or due to vol-
untary contamination by a jammer) the precoder will disperse
the power, resulting in potential leakage and poor link quality.
The later leads to service unavailability, giving rise to a denial
of service (DoS) type of attack, as described in [3]. Similar
attacks can also be launched at the medium access control
(MAC) by tampering with the CSI reports sent by the devices.
As a result, the beam management phase during network entry
is vulnerable to RF jamming attacks. It is therefore crucial to
have the means to detect, locate and neutralize jammers, or
implement mitigation solutions.
D. Privacy
Although 5G incorporates a set of measures to enhance
privacy in terms of user identity (subscription) privacy, recent
research [4] on user location privacy and user untraceability
has shown that there are still many open issues based on one
hand on the information leaked by the lower-layer wireless
protocols, and on the other hand on design issues in the
higher-layer protocols (e.g., the authenticated key agreement
(AKA) protocols). Moreover, the privacy guarantees are rather
weak from an end-user perspective. So far, they only consider
attacks by outsiders (e.g., eavesdroppers on the wireless link),
while internal attacks, e.g., by untrustworthy operators, are not
considered. Given that the amount of personal data handled by
future mobile networks will substantially increase (see Section
III on the numerous nodes deployed with advanced sensory
capabilities), and, considering that governmental agencies as
well as adversarial entities have potentially a high interest
in such data, future wireless networks have to be designed
to ensure privacy without having to place trust in operators.
As an example, privacy concerns and data ownership have
been highlighted as some of the most difficult hurdles in the
deployment of smart cities.
E. Post-Quantum Resilience
A further challenge comes from quantum computing, which
has seen significant progress after massive earlier investments.
Recently, prototypes of more than 50 qubits have been an-
nounced. Since some of the most important cryptographic
algorithms used in 5G are not quantum-resistant, the related
protocols have to be redesigned involving post-quantum crypto
algorithms. The national institute of standardization (NIST) is
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currently evaluating novel post-quantum crypto algorithms to
replace current state-of-the-art public key encryption schemes.
Nevertheless, it is a common concern that quantum resistance
will lead, at least in the immediate future, to an increase in
terms of the complexity of the new crypto systems as key sizes
might pose a significant problem. This could be especially
challenging for URLLC and low-power / low-cost devices,
further highlighting conflicting trends in future systems and
the interplay between computational based crypto and real-
time communication between low-end devices.
F. Low-cost IoT devices
Further exploring the aspect of low-end IoT devices, these
are likely to be inapt to support advanced security mech-
anisms, due to computing power, memory and – probably
most challenging – energy consumption constraints. Although
lightweight cryptography could help to address some of the
challenges, such algorithms are currently not part of 5G and
the development of lightweight post-quantum solutions is a
recent field of research. Another aspect with potentially high
impact in the short-term is that it is desirable that some of
the low-cost IoT devices do not have a SIM card for cost
reduction reasons. Nevertheless, some of these terminals may
carry critical information that needs to be authenticated and
protected. New protection mechanisms that are lightweight,
but nevertheless as secure as the existing conventional mech-
anisms, must therefore be put in place.
G. Huge number of IoT devices
The envisioned huge number (trillions) of very diverse IoT
devices connected to the B5G network induces not only great
challenges in terms of information security management, but,
is in itself a security risk. Even if any individual insecure,
low-cost IoT device amounts to only a needle-stick – thanks
to potential aggregation in large scale botnets (e.g., the 2016
Mirai attack) – the overall impact can be severe. Therefore, in
future mobile networks many related types of attacks, currently
largely ignored, must be considered. In this aspect, decen-
tralised intrusion / anomaly detection becomes important [5].
H. Long-term IoT Security
Another factor at play is that many IoT devices will typically
have a very long lifespan (>10 years as opposed to 3 years for
a laptop) and can be distributed in large geographical areas.
The impact of this is threefold. Firstly, any required security
updates (e.g., software updates and security patches) might be
difficult to deploy in large-scale networks with geographically
scattered IoT devices. Additionally, the security updates might
not be available at all, for instance, if the manufacturer is not
able or willing to provide them (as it is often the case today,
even for more expensive devices like smartphones). Moreover,
despite recent advances in lightweight cryptography, it is
difficult to guarantee that mass-produced, computationally and
power constrained IoT devices will have a hardware capable
of being updated with the necessary patches to resist all the
threats that will arise in their lifetimes (e.g., post-quantum
resistance).
The aforementioned security challenges can potentially be
addressed with the aid of novel 6G features, as explained in
the next section.
III. 6G AS AN ENABLER TO CONTEXT AWARE QUALITY
OF SECURITY LEVERAGING PLS
Even though 6G is still some years away from standard-
ization, consensus is growing on its likely evolution path.
Whereas new security challenges will arise in the near future
as outlined in Section II, 6G will also provide us with a new set
of features that might help us tackle these challenges. These
features are briefly outlined in the following.
• Higher frequencies and bandwidth: Continuing the
evolution seen in the previous generations, 6G will make
use of ever higher carrier frequencies and bandwidth,
moving towards frequencies above 100 GHz [6], which
allows the allocation of bandwidths larger than 1 GHz.
The large bandwidth may increase the channel entropy
in the frequency domain, which can potentially be ex-
ploited in PLS primitives, notably in secret key gener-
ation (SKG) from wireless coefficients [7], whose prin-
cipal mechanisms are depicted in Fig. 1. Additionally,
the use of higher frequencies will make beamforming
with pencil-sharp beams both a possibility, because of
the smallest area occupied by antenna arrays, and a
necessity, because of the need to compensate for the
higher channel attenuation, offering a viable application
scenario for the wiretap channel.
• Integrated sensing and communications: Sensing is
likely to be a key component of 6G. In addition to
high-resolution image, video and sound, among other
possible sensing data, which can be transmitted through
mobile communication networks, radar sensing is likely
to be an integral part of future wireless systems [8],
reusing the same spectrum and waveform as communi-
cations. These new capabilities along with centimetre-
level localization precision will allow the network to
have a better understanding of the surroundings and gain
situational awareness, i.e., understanding of the context
of communication. This, on the other hand, raises other
security issues, as the sensing data themselves may be
subject to tampering by attackers, and their integrity
must be assured.
• Learning at the wireless edge: Centralized machine
learning, which processes data centrally using cloud-
based computing, can suffer from critical security chal-
lenges, e.g., a single point of failure and the vulnerability
of data during backhaul. Moreover, due to the capacity
requirements and latency resulting from centralized data
aggregation and processing, it might not be suitable for
real-time applications. Thus, decentralized ML solutions,
such as federated learning, in which data are in principle
kept locally at end-user devices where it is collected, are
becoming increasingly important. While such distributed
ML solutions can serve as enabling technologies for 6G
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Step 2: Information reconciliation: Alice her syndrome to Bob, so he can 
correct discrepancies of his observation 
Step 1: Advantage distillation: Alice and Bob exploit the reciprocity of  
the wireless channel to extract shared randomness
Figure 1. Distilling symmetric keys from wireless coefficients hAB in multipath channels, exploiting channel reciprocity during the channel’s coherence
time. The procedure comprises three phases, referred to as advantage distillation, information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
mobile edge networks, they also are susceptible to se-
curity issues, such as the leakage of private information
through learned model parameters, malicious end-user
devices and adversarial training examples.
These anticipated 6G features provide novel opportunities
to address the security and privacy challenges outlined in Sec-
tion II, allowing for the security architecture of 6G networks
to be built around automation. Following the principles of
multilateral security [15] the system should understand the
security goals of the entities involved and should adapt the
security controls accordingly based on contextual information,
harvested from the novel 6G features. To this end, we need a
set of building blocks:
i) The ability to express the desired and actual “level of
security”;
ii) New, adaptive security controls;
iii) “Understanding” the context;
iv) Automation in the form of a ML/AI based security
orchestrator.
In the following subsections we will present some of these
necessary building blocks.
A. Quantifying Security: Quality of Security (QoSec)
Similar to QoS definitions (e.g., [ITU-T E.800]), quality
of security is the totality of characteristics of a service that
bear on its ability to satisfy stated and implied security needs
of the user of the service. QoSec is helpful in the general
direction of being able to provide different security guarantees,
in response to the security needs of different use cases and
related slices of the network, reflecting on the DiffServ QoS
paradigm. A central aspect related to QoSec is to identify how
to make the security level and its implementation adaptive,
i.e., how to automatically identify the right QoSec and the
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right combination of crypto schemes (encryption, integrity,
authentication primitives), as well as how to incorporate these
flexibly in security protocols.
Thereby, adaptivity can happen at different levels: for a fixed
cryptographic strength (e.g., 256-bit symmetric block ciphers
considering quantum-resistant) and a fixed attacker model
(e.g., “zero trust”, i.e., minimal (trust) assumptions regarding
all involved entities) we can adapt the specific cryptographic
algorithms and protocols that are used [9]. On the other hand,
we could also adapt the desired cryptographic strength or the
considered attacker model based on contextual information.
In future security protocols varying levels of trustworthiness
(e.g., as defined by NIST in SP800-53 Rev. 4) are envisioned
through the use of security control baselines. Note that these
are developed based on a number of general assumptions,
including common environmental, operational, and functional
considerations, giving rise to the question of context awareness
in security.
B. Context Awareness at the Wireless Edge: The Role of
Artificial Intelligence
The opening up of the THz spectrum will provide
new “sensing” capabilities to 6G devices, such as high-
definition imaging and frequency spectroscopy. In combina-
tion with high-precision localization, as showcased recently
for mmWave systems, these enhanced sensing capabilities
can prove instrumental in understanding context and could
naturally be incorporating in trust building and predicting
reliability. Incorporating context awareness in security controls
amounts to being able to provide answers – with the aid of
AI – to the following open-ended questions:
1 How to measure the threat level from context: PHY
layer inputs, particularly in the form of sensing in-
formation including the location of a node, the time
of communication, the ambient temperature, etc., carry
important contextual information, directly related to
semantics. We can envision AI based fusion of sensing
information to obtain an enhanced evaluation of the
threat level.
2 How to use context to identify the security level
required for particular data flows / slices: We need
to take steps towards defining new metrics describing
the criticality of the particular data exchanged and
furthermore, how valuable they are considered from an
adversarial point of view. This can be thought of as the
analogous of defining the priority level in QoS.
3 How to match security levels to security schemes:
After defining the security level with rapport to the
context of communication, the next question is how to
map this to an actual set of algorithms and security
schemes. Two approaches emerge that can possibly be
used jointly: i) a crypto based approaches, in which the
strength of crypto systems is, roughly speaking, related
to the lengths of the keys (after the right transformations
are accounted for); ii) PLS approaches, in which the
wireless channel and the hardware are used as sources
of uniqueness (for authentication) and / or entropy for
confidentiality purposes (e.g., for SKG) [7].
C. Adaptive Security Controls: The Role of Physical Layer
Security in 6G
In the past years, PLS [10], [11] has been studied and
indicated as a possible way to emancipate networks from
classic, complexity based, security approaches [12]. PLS is
based on the premise that we can complement some of the
core security functions, exploiting both the communication
radio channel and the hardware as sources of uniqueness or of
entropy.
It is usually this latter aspect of PLS that is considered in
the literature, around the concept of the secrecy capacity and
of the SKG capacity [13]. In this framework, PLS leverages
the physical properties of the radio channel, namely diffusion,
superposition and reciprocity, to create opportunities for secure
data transmission in the presence of eavesdroppers in the
channel. These properties can be exploited in a variety of ways,
including taking advantage of independent fading between le-
gitimate users and eavesdroppers, the use of multiple-antennas
or relays to create secure degrees of freedom, and jamming
of eavesdroppers. The use of PLS will profit from the pencil-
sharp beams likely to be available in 6G [14], as they will
make eavesdropping very difficult by attackers not located in
the beam direction, while the same is true for visible light
communications [12]. Additionally, the high bandwidth may
provide enough entropy to help the generation of high-rate
secret keys [7].
As a source of uniqueness, we can leverage PHY by
using RF fingerprinting and high-precision localization. It is
worth mentioning that many new features of future networks,
like low-latency control loops, sensor fusion or simultaneous
localization and mapping (SLAM) will require only local
communications, not involving the core network. These can be
made more secure and agile if PLS is employed, alleviating
the need for network-based centralized security. In this context,
PLS enabled by ML can be used for intelligent PHY authenti-
cation in dynamic and complex 6G environments such as IoT
networks. Thanks to the ability of ML techniques to learn and
capture statistics of complex features, we can achieve low-cost,
continuous, highly reliable, model-independent, and context-
aware authentication, e.g., leveraging localization and RF
fingerprinting. To enhance the reliability of such authentication
mechanisms, the trustworthiness of the observed and estimated
attributes needs to be monitored, accounting for context.
Finally, in terms of authentication, it is further possible
to leverage “hardware fingerprints” in the form of physical
unclonable functions (PUFs), as an authentication factor in
multi-factor authentication protocols. PUFs rely on the use
of Wyner-Ziv reconciliation approaches to offer measurable
re-usability of the hardware fingerprint. Combining various
PLS technologies, hybrid PLS-crypto systems can be built
around the ideas of zero-round trip time (0-RTT) protocols
and / or authenticated encryption [13], offering further tools
to develop fast authentication schemes at PHY, potentially
exploiting multiple authentication factors.
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Channel treated as either a source of uniqueness or a source of entropy
When one is not available, the other probably is…
So far we have studied the channel for the reliability point of view
Need to characterize the channel from the security point of view
Study channel predictability / unpredictability => align with semantic security
Figure 2. The wireless channel can act as a source of entropy or as a source of uniqueness for authentication.
PLS offers notable advantages. Firstly, it is inherently adap-
tive; by adjusting the target secrecy rate or secret key rate,
one can adapt related secrecy outage probabilities, offering a
flexible framework with respect to adaptive security controls.
Furthermore, PLS can provide information-theoretic security
guarantees using lightweight mechanisms (e.g., using Polar
or low density parity check (LDPC) encoders) as opposed to
computationally expensive cryptographic schemes. Thus, such
approaches are suitable for low complexity IoT devices and
for networks with light or no infrastructure, either as stand-
alone best-effort security mechanisms or as complements to
more traditional methods. It is noteworthy that as the line-
of-sight conditions and the channel quality change, there is a
clear trade-off between the use of the CSI for high precision
localization for authentication or as the means to distil entropy
for use in confidentiality and integrity schemes, showcased in
Fig. 2. This unique setting can only be exploited with enhanced
monitoring of the wireless channel and of the context in
general, revealing that context awareness is indeed an enabler
for PLS.
D. Discussion and Practical Examples
Looking at the broader picture, down the path towards 6G,
novel security challenges and opportunities arise. Among the
challenges, noteworthy are issues related to vulnerabilities in
the initial entry phases of a node in a network (before the
enactment of the 5G security protocols), the massive number of
low-end and heterogeneous IoT devices, sub-millisecond delay
constraints for critical IoT use cases, etc., while offering post-
quantum security guarantees and addressing issues of privacy.
On the other hand, 6G is expected to be the first generation of
wireless to offer edge- and device-level intelligence, leveraging
novel sensing capabilities and the extensive use of ML. The
incorporation of context awareness in 6G security protocols
can propel the introduction of disruptive new technologies to
provide flexible and adaptive security guarantees, based on an
on-line evaluation of the security threat level.
It is in this context that PLS technologies can be truly
exploited; PLS can be realised only with provably trustworthy
monitoring and understanding of the communication environ-
ment and communication medium in 6G. In applications such
as the IoT, PLS emerges as a very competitive candidate
to be used in context-aware, flexible and adaptive security
controls, both for authentication as well as for confidentiality
schemes. While PLS might not, at least in the near future, be
incorporated in zero-trust security protocols, it does provide
a viable alternative to securing massive and ultra-low latency
networks with relaxed security guarantees, as a competitive
candidate for emerging QoSec approaches that will cut across
all layers of the network stack.
To exemplify some of the points made previously, in Table
I we present a roadmap on how to address the security
challenges listed in Section II. We want to emphasize that the
presented ideas are still just parts of the puzzle and have to be
embedded in a much more holistic approach, which, besides
additional technical means, has to incorporate organisational,
regulatory, economical – and not to forget: standardisation –
aspects.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Unarguably, 5G security enhancements present a big im-
provement with respect to LTE. However, as the complexity
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Table I. ROADMAP OF SOLUTIONS FOR 5G / 6G SECURITY CHALLENGES
Security Challenge / Scenario Recommended techniques (with ∗ we denote PLS / PHY solutions)
False Base Station Attacks
∗ Intelligent PHY authentication using RF fingerprinting and localization of BS from UE (inverse localization)
∗ Pre-shared keys established / distributed with SKG
Low Latency Communications
∗ Fast authentication using PUFs and RF fingerprinting as early authentication factors
∗ Short packet secrecy encoding
∗ Short blocklength Slepian Wolf and Wyner Ziv reconciliation decoders (for SKG and PUFs)
Jamming Attacks in mMIMO — RF Resilience
∗ Spectrum sensing, channel charting, channel learning
∗ Advanced modulation and coding
∗ Intrusion detection at PHY
∗ Covert communications / low probability of detection
Privacy
- Context aware choice of pseudonymity, partial identities
- Contextual aware integrity to detect and mitigate violations
- Context aware appropriateness and distribution
Post-Quantum Resilience
∗ PLS is information theoretic secure
∗ Long symmetric encryption keys using channel-based key generation
∗ Hybrid crypto-PLS schemes
Low-cost IoT devices
∗PLS is lightweight, secrecy encoders, SKG, PUfs, etc.
Awareness of low-cost / low-security IoT devices for appropriate isolation in a dedicated network slice
Huge Number of IoT devices
- Contextual understanding to automatically select appropriated QoSec
- Adaptive and automatic security controls removing the burden to manually configure and monitor all the IoT devices
∗ PLS as a scalable technique for key management and distribution
∗ PLS as adaptive security scheme
Long-term IoT security
- Awareness of a decrease over time in QoSec and trusthwortiness
- Automatic adoption of the overall security controls and policies
- Context aware access control, e.g., excluding untrustworthy devices from the network or reduction of (access) rights
of the application scenarios increases with the introduction of
novel use cases, notably URLLC and mMTC, novel security
challenges arise that might be difficult to address using the
standard paradigm of complexity based classical cryptographic
solutions. At the same time, in the longer 10-year horizon
novel security concepts based on “trust models” and risk-
based, adaptive identity management and access control will
come to life, enabled to a large extend by AI. To allow for
flexible QoSec in the DiffServ framework, the development
and integration of security controls at all layers of the com-
munications system is envisioned.
In this framework, PLS is being considered as a possible
way to emancipate networks from classical, complexity based,
security approaches. Since the wireless channel is reciprocal,
time-varying and random in nature, it offers a valid, inher-
ently secure source for key agreement protocols between two
communicating parties. This is pertinent to many forthcoming
6G applications that will require strong, but nevertheless,
lightweight mechanisms; in this direction, PLS may offer such
solutions, or complement existing algorithms, with minimal
changes in the control plane. With respect to authentication,
PUFs, wireless fingerprinting / localization, combined with
more classical approaches, could also enhance AKA in de-
manding scenarios. In parallel, THz communications will rely
upon setting up radio “wires”, potentially providing a concrete
scenario for the wiretap channel.
As a conclusion, context awareness enabled by the novel
6G capabilities can allow introducing disruptive tools for
providing adaptive security guarantees, tailored to the context
of the communication. These new opportunities can be in 6G
combined with advances on PHY modulation and transmission
to offer solid opportunities for the employment of PLS in
novel, flexible QoSec approaches.
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